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The U.S. Justice Department filed suit against the 
National Association of Broadcasters in 1979, charging that 
its Television Code restricted the supply of advertising. 
Had the case, which was settled by consent decree in 1982, 
gone to trial under a "rule of reason," the cartel effects 
of the code would have been examined. 
This paper employs a number of statistical techniques to 
see if the code provided cartel benefits. The results 
suggest that the decision to become a code member cannot be 
ascribed to cartel effects of the code. 
Submission draft. Not to be quoted. 
AN OPEC IN FANTASYLAND?
 
The NAB Television Code as Cartel
 
Introduction 1 
In June, 1979, the Antitrust Division of the 
u.S. Justice Department filed suit against the National 
Association of Broadcasters (NAB), charging that certain 
provisions of its Television Code constituted unreasonable 
restraint of trade and commerce in violation of the Sherman 
Act. The questionable provisions regulated quantity, 
length, placement, and format of "non-program material" 
(commercials and promotional announcements) that code 
subscribers could broadcast. These advertising restrictions 
were eliminated from the code when the case was settled by 
consent decree in November, 1982. 
lThe authors are grateful to William Greene, William 
Mason, and Albert Anderson for programming assistance, and 
to Kenneth Boyer and Rick Bold for reading a preliminary 
draft. Special thanks to Stanley M. Besen and referees for 
comments. The usual nostra culpa applies. 
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Economic theory and antitrust case law have established 
that a trade association like the NAB may facilitate 
collusion by firms in the industry. If the association's 
efforts are successful, joint firm profit increases. Was 
the NAB's Television Code an instrument of collusion? 
Clearly the Justice Department thought so, and it can be 
argued that NAB and code practices fell into the category of 
proscribed behavior established by legal precedent in trade 
association cases. If it was such an instrument, and if the 
suit had been tried in court under a per se rule, the NAB 
would have lost. Thus, the consent decree may have 
protected the NAB from subsequent treble-damage suits. 
On the other hand, many observers of the commercial 
broadcasting industry considered the code ineffective, 
unenforceable, and honored as often as not in the breach. 
Under a "rule of reason," applied in most court decisions 
involving trade association conspiracy, the question of the 
actual anticompetitive effect of the code arises. 
The effect of the code is analyzed in this paper. The 
next part discusses the history of the NAB and the 
Television Code, summarizes the course of the government 
antitrust suit, and makes some conjectures regarding legal 
interpretation of NAB code practices. Part Two uses a model 
of television station behavior to show how a television 
station cartel can raise station profit by restricting 
number of commercials broadcast. The model also shows how 
colluding stations may dissipate profit by competing over 
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program quality. Parts Three and Four employ single­
equation and simultaneous-equation estimation techniques, 
respectively, to determine if cartel-like activities of the 
code had any discernible influence on station asset values 
or station behavior. Part Five summarizes the findings and 
concludes that no anticompetitive effects of the code can be 




The National Association of Broadcasters was formed in 
1923 during a time of confusion and conflict in the 
fledgling radio broadcast industry. RCA and AT&T were 
trying to extend their patent monopolies on crucial 
components of radio transmitters, the second Washington 
Radio Conference was allocating frequency bands on the radio 
spectrum, and the American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers was demanding royalty fees for use of copyrighted 
music played on the air (Barnouw, 1966, pp. 114-21). By 
banding together in what must have been perceived as self ­
defense, commercial radio stations felt they could better 
protect their interests. The NAB lobbied before Congress 
for favorable allocation of frequencies and provided legal 
support for stations being sued for royalty payments. 
In the years after its formation, the NAB's role in the 
industry expanded to include provision of various technical 
services to members and promotion of industry self­
regulation. The principal instrument of self-regulation has 
been voluntary codes of station behavior whose provisions 
are divided between progra~ing ethics and advertising 
standards. The first NAB radio code was ratified in 1929. 
The first television code was adopted in 1952, shortly after 
television stations were admitted to the NAB. 
5
 
Self-regulation can serve three purposes. Publishing 
ethical standards builds good public relations, important 
for an industry so dependent on the whim of congress and 
about which consumers are so sensitive. Also, by giving the 
appearance of policing themselves, commercial broadcasters 
may forestall more inflexible or undesirable regulation by 
the Federal Communications Commission and other government 
agencies. Finally, by providing focal point output levels 
for advertising and by monitoring station compliance with 
code recommendations, the NAB may organize the industry in 
an anti-competitive way. It was the ability of the NAB to 
accomplish this last task which concerned the Justice 
Department's antitrust division. 
The Antitrust Suit Against the Television Code 
The Justice Department filed suit against the Television 
Code of the NAB in 1979, alleging: 
. that the NAB had violated Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act by combining and conspiring to restrain trade. 
Specifically . . . the NAB had promulgated and enforced 
a television code, certain provisions of which 
restricted the quantity, placement, and format of 
television advertisements (47 Fed. Reg. 32813, 29 
July 1982). 
Four sets of television code advertising rules were 
challenged: 2 commercial time limitations, program 
2The Radio Code and provisions of the Television Code 
not related to advertising were unaffected by the suit. The 
challenged paragraphs of the code are reprinted in Appendix 




interruptions, consecutive announcements, and multiple 
product advertisements. The code set maximum limits on the 
number of minutes of commercials and promotional 
announcements during program periods. For example, network 
affiliates were limited to nine and one-half minutes of non-
program material per hour during prime time. Separate 
standards applied during non-prime hours and for independent 
stations. 
Additional standards limited the number of interruptions 
per program period and the number of commercials per 
interruption. Provisions of the code also prohibited 
advertising two or more separate products in an announcement 
of less than sixty seconds. Exceptions and additions to 
these limits applied to children's programs, news programs, 
sports programs, and short features. 
The government's suit claimed that, as a result of the 
above code provisions, "purchasers of television advertising 
time have been deprived of the benefits of free and open 
competition among television broadcasters" (Broadcasting, 18 
June 1979, p. 27). The NAB countered the government's claim 
using four arguments. (1) The association's attempts to 
avoid over-commercialization were valued by the public. 3 
(2) Subscription to the code was voluntary. (3) The 
government needed to show an anti-competitive purpose to the 




code. (4) The code was endorsed by the FCC and other 
government agencies. 
The Justice Department responded to each NAB argument. 
(1) Fear of losing viewers would prompt individual stations 
to avoid over-commercialization without NAB help. 4 (2) The 
code was "not a mere set of advisory standards which 
subscribers may choose to ignore, but a contractual 
arrangement to which they are obligated to adhere." (3) The 
intent of the code was open to debate, but "anticompetitive 
effect would be enough to prove a violation of the law." 
(4) Endorsement of the code by government bodies other than 
Congress does not confer antitrust immunity.5 
In March 1982, the District Court issued a summary 
judgment requiring the NAB to suspend enforcement of the 
rule prohibiting multiple product commercials (paragraph 
IX). The NAB immediately suspended enforcement of all the 
challenged code rules. In July of that year the Justice 
Department filed a proposed consent decree and the NAB 
accepted, reasoning that continued litigation would be 
costly, that they were losing the case, and that loss after 
trial would expose the association to subsequent private 
4After the code advertising provisions were suspended 
in 1982, the only restrictions on commercials were those 
adopted by the FCC in 1973: sixteen minutes per hour for all 
stations (twenty minutes during political campaigns). 
Recent FCC staff studies find that most stations are below 
these limits (Smyntek and Peterson, 1984: Donovan, 1984). 
SThe charges and countercharges are quoted or 
paraphrased in Broadcasting, 8 March 1982, pp. 37-38. 
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suits and treble-damage claims (Broadcasting, 19 July 1982, 
p. 39). 
The decree was officially entered on November 23, 1982. 
By its provisions, the NAB immediately canceled the 
challenged portions of paragraphs IX, XIV, and XV of the 
code, and agreed not to reinstate them for ten years' (U.S. 
v. NAB, 1982). In accepting the consent degree, the NAB 
leaves undetermined the ultimate court ruling on the case, a 
decision resting largely on whether NAB restrictions on 
commercials were per se illegal or should be decided by a 
rule of reason. 
The Rule of Reason and Trade Association Cases 
As of a decade ago, the Justice Department routinely 
filed about ten cases a year against trade associations, the 
majority of which ended in consent decrees (Wilcox and 
Shepherd, 1975, p. 162). Trade associations are most 
commonly charged with some form of price-fixing violation of 
the Sherman Act, Section One. 
Price-fixing conspiracy is usually subject to a per se 
prohibition, but trade association pricing activities are 
treated differently, and naturally so. Trade associations 
often use price reporting systems. These systems are said 
to improve market functioning under some conditions and to 
'An interesting question not considered here is the 
effect of such a limited injunction. How does a ten year 




facilitate collusion under others. Price reporting is not 
per se illegal; the court examines the circumstances 
surrounding a plan and its consequences.? Even in United 
states v. Container Corp. of America, et al. (393 u.s. 333, 
1969), where the courts came close to applying a per se rule 
to a trade association case, the structure of the market, 
elasticity of demand, and stabilizing effects of the sharing 
of price information were all taken into account before a 
verdict was reached. 8 
The NAB's Television Code was not a price reporting 
scheme. However, it may have served as a focal point for 
present and planned restrictions of output (number and 
length of commercials), and there were penalties (exposure, 
expulsion) on sellers who did not adhere to the code's 
provisions. Had the case gone to trial, a rule of reason 
may well have been applied.' If so, the question of the 
actual anticompetitive effects of the code's advertising 
restrictions would have arisen. It is this question which 
the remainder of this paper addresses. 
?According to Wilcox and Shepherd, for these systems to 
avert antitrust challenge they need to (1) be fully 
available to all sellers and buyers, ·(2) not identify 
traders, (3) cover only past sales, not present or planned 
ones, (4) avoid circulating average prices (focal points for 
new price agreements), and (5) be free of any controls or 
penalties on sellers (1975, p. 160). 
8The evolution of trade association price-fixing case 
law is briefly traced in Asch (1983), pp. 214-17. 
'In preliminary arguments the NAB specifically asked 
for a rule of reason interpretation of the case, while the 
Justice Department requested application of per se 
(Broadcasting, 10 December 1979, p. 93). 
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II. Television Station Behavior 
In typical industries, joint profit increases if firms 
collectively restrict output of their product. The 
potential gains to television stations from collusive 
behavior are less obvious. The output of television 
stations is not television commercials, and measuring the 
product is not as easy a task as in, say, manufacturing 
industries. Because the product is difficult to measure, 
substantial opportunity is present for cheating on non­
measured dimensions of the product. This section describes 
television stations' product and shows how some or all 
potential monopoly profit may be dissipated by competition 
on program quality. 
A commercial television station broadcasts programs and 
non-program material, including paid advertisements, free of 
charge to a viewing audience. The station's programs corne 
from a network (if the station is a network affiliate), from 
syndicators who sell individual programs to stations, and 
from the station's own production facilities. Station 
revenue comes from sale of commercial time on programs and 




Advertisers in turn purchase commercial air time in 
order to produce customer advertising response--increased 
sales. Advertisers buy commercial time from the national 
networks, from agents representing a number of stations in a 
region, or directly from individual stations. Some 
commercial time on syndicated programs is also sold 
separately by the syndicator. 
Although the observed transaction in the television 
advertising market is for commercial time, the actual 
product sold by television stations is viewers watching 
commercials. Advertisers are interested in buying 
commercial time on a program only if the program is watched 
by viewers. A "commercial exposure"lO is defined as one 
viewer watching one commercial and hereafter is treated as 
the product sold by television stations. 
The price per commercial exposure is not directly 
observed in the market. Advertisers are interested in 
showing commercials to viewers and are only willing to pay 
for air time if viewers are exposed to those commercials. 
Thus the price paid by an advertiser and observed in the 
market is directly related to the number of people who are 
exposed to the commercial. This direct relationship is 
lOThe term is used by Beals (1980) and is similar to 
others used in the industry, examples being: "impressions" 
(same meaning as exposures), "reach" (the share of the 
audience which sees a commercial at least once), "frequency" 
(the average number of times a commercial is seen by those 
who see it at least once), and""gross rating points" (the 
product of reach and frequency). See Christensen (1981) and 
deKluyver and Givon (1981). 
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confirmed by the industry practice of calculating "price per 
thousand viewers" for advertising expenditures and by 
including provisions in advertising contracts guaranteeing a 
minimum number of program viewers. ll 
Television stations contemplating collusion to maximize 
joint profit have the same objectives as a multi-station 
television monopoly. Such a monopoly chooses the number of 
commercials and the program characteristics of each station 
to maximize profit from sale of commercial exposures. Some 
characteristics of programs can be changed without changing 
program cost. A police drama can be produced for the same 
cost as a hospital drama, for example. For simplicity, 
these program characteristics are assumed constant. l2 Other 
characteristics of programs are costly and are here labelled 
program quality. Improving a given police drama by hiring 
more popular actors is an example of a change in program 
quality. 
If costless program characteristics are held constant, 
the monopoly chooses number of commercials and program 
quality for each station so as to maximize R = LR.,
1 
i=l, ..• ,m where: 
R. = pn . A. (n1 ' . . . ,n , q1 ' . . . ,q ) - wq. - k. (1 ) 
111 m m 1 1 
llFor examples of these two practices see Television 
Bureau of Advertising (1980-81) and Broadcasting, 27 October 
1980, p. 7. 
l2Choice of program characteristics by monopoly and 





R. =	 station profit or net revenue~ 
1 
p =	 price per commercial exposure, assumed to be a 
function of total exposures1 3 in the local market 
and uniform for all stations~ 
n. = number of commercials shown by the station;
1 
A. =	 station its audience size function~ 
1 
q. =	 station program quality index~ 
1 
w =	 cost per unit of program quality, assumed 
exogenous and uniform for all stations~14 
k. =	 station fixed costs, assumed exogenous.
1 
Hence, n.A. is the number of commercial exposures
1 1 
produced by the ith station. The model assumes aA./an. < 0,
1	 1 
2 2aA./an. > 0, aA./aq. > 0, a A./aq. < 0, and aA./aq. < 0 for 
]	 1 1 1 1 1 ] 1 
stations j¢i. As the number of commercials' (n i ) increases, 
the	 number of viewers (A.) of station i falls 1s and the 
1 
number of viewers of other stations increase. If program 
quality (qi) increases, the number of viewers of station i 
increases (but at a decreasing rate) and the number of 
viewers of other stations falls. The profit function 
13A reasonable assumption to the extent advertisers 
substitute commercials between stations. 
14Using a non-linear cost function adds complexity to 
the model without altering its implications. 
lSSome small number of interruptions in a program 
increase the number of viewers, since viewers surely prefer 
some interruptions to none. However, profit-maximizing 
stations will always add commercials until the marginal 




contains no term for the cost of producing commercials. 
Additional commercials are assumed to displace programming 
of identical cost. 
If the NAB code successfully restricts the number of 
commercials shown by colluding stations, and if stations 
produce that program quality chosen by a monopoly, joint 
station profit is maximized. However, nothing in economic 
theory assures successful collusion. Each station is 
tempted to cheat, first by increasing its number of 
commercials. The temptation increases if station 
misbehavior is difficult to punish (the code is voluntary). 
The difficulties experienced by the OPEC cartel are a good 
example of the tendency of conspirators to exceed voluntary 
output restrictions. 
Since quantity is not the only dimension of the 
television product, even perfectly enforced output standards 
do not assure joint profit maximization. A television 
station cartel controlling only the number of commercials 
leaves room for stations to compete in program quality and 
such competition may dissipate part or all potential 
monopoly profit. 
Assume colluding stations establish a standard for 
number of commercials (n*) shown by each station. The 
number of commercials is set at the joint profit-maximizing 
level. For simplicity, stations are assumed identical so 
the standard is the same for all stations. Given the 
optimal number of commercials, colluding stations would 
15
 
choose program quality for each station to maximize profit. 
From equation (1): 
aR a aA. aR. 
= n*A.QQ + n*p--_l - w + (m-l)--l = 0 ( 2 ) 
1aq. aq. aq . aq . 
1 1 1 1 
The first term represents the loss of revenue due to the 
lower price from sale of additional commercial exposures. 16 
The second term is the additional revenue from the increase 
in its audience because of higher quality programs. The 
third term (w) is the marginal expense of additional 
quality. The last term is the effect on profit to other 
stations of increases in its program quality and is negative 
for two reasons. As q. increases, the price of commercial 
1 
exposures falls, and as q. increases, other stations lose 
1 
viewers. 
If it set a standard for number of commercials a cartel 
would choose n*. But given that standard, individual 
stations may be tempted to compete on the uncontrolled 
dimension, program quality. Assume that individual stations 
16ap/aqi is negative when the increase in exposures 
produced by station i is not completely offset by decreases 
in commercial exposures produced by all other stations, a 
reasonable conclusion if a change in quality by station i 
has more effect on station its audience than on audiences of 
other stations. Fournier (1985) assumes and cites research 
which shows that total audience (A) is largely independent 
of station actions (aA/aqi=O). If so, ap/aqi=O since the 
increase in audience to i is exactly offset by a decrease in 
audience to other stations. The derivative also equals zero 
if stations are price takers in relevant markets (Fournier 
and Martin, 1983). This paper's conclusions are unaffected 
by adopting Fournier's assumption. 
16
 
take n* as given and maximize individual profit with respect 
to program quality (qi). Also assume each station believes 
other stations' program quality choice remain constant. 
That is, each station makes a Cournot-like assumption by 
ignoring the effect of its choice of quality on behavior of 
other stations. l7 Equation (3) rearranges such a firm's 
first order condition. Equation (4) rearranges the monopoly 
condition of equation ( 2 ) . 
aA.
 






n*p--1 = - n*A.Q:Q - (m-l)----l - W (4 )

1aq. aq. oq.
1 1 1 
Starting at the monopoly level of quality, marginal 
value of quality (left side term) is the same in both 
equations. The marginal cost of quality is lower for the 
competing station, however. The first terms to the right of 
the equality and ware the same in both equations, but the 
monopoly has an additional cost of quality. The monopoly 
must consider the lower profit to all other stations for an 
increase in i's quality. Given that the marginal cost of 
doing so is lower, an imperfectly colluding station which 
only faces a restriction on number of commercials chooses 
17This assumption is used in other television research 
(Fournier, 1985) and is common in other work on non-price 
competition (Douglas and Miller, 1974). The assumption' 
seems consistent with the rivalrous nature of television 
programming and with behavior in many other markets, even 
those with a small number of firms (Kwoka, 1979). 
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more program quality than is desired by perfectly colluding 
stations. 
Since imperfectly colluding stations choose "higher 
program quality than a monopoly, joint station profit must 
also be lower than the monopoly maximum. Stations are 
dissipating monopoly profit by competing on an uncontrolled 
varlable. Whether all monopoly profit is dissipated depends 
on the nature of the cost functions. 
Ignoring fixed costs, if the' marginal cost of quality 
(or marginal cost of exposures) is everywhere greater than 
average cost, an equilibrium obtains where stations earn 
some monopoly profit. 18 Since entry of new stations is 
effectively eliminated in most markets by FCC frequency 
allocation limits, such profit persists. Although the 
direct cost of quality (w) is assumed constant, the 
opportunity cost of quality includes the other right side 
term in equation (3). Marginal cost increases if the 
derivative of the term with respect to q. is positive, which 
1 
will be true so long as the second derivatives of A. and A. 
1 J 
with respect to q. are negative. 1 ' This diminishing
1 
marginal effectiveness of program quality is a reasonable 
assumption, at least for sufficiently high levels of 
quality. 
18This is a sufficient condition. The necessary 
condition is that average revenue be greater than average 
cost. 
l'aA./aq. is positive by our definition of quality.
1 1 
18 
The model thus shows that stations competing with 
program quality may retain part of monopoly profit. The 
model cannot guarantee that profit is protected, however. 
For one, sufficiently high fixed costs eliminate the profit. 
In addition, the marginal effect on audience may not 
everywhere diminish. Even if positive, monopoly profit to 
stations may be of a trivial magnitude. Profit may be lower 
if each station makes assumptions about other station 
response different from the Cournot assumption made in this 
model. Profit is further dissipated if restrictions on 
number of commercials are imperfectly enforced by the Code 
Authority. 
A rule of reason decision in the Television Code case 
requires determining the anticompetitive effect of the Code. 
Although suggestive, economic theory alone cannot prove that 
the Code increases station profit even if it manages to 
reduce the number of commercials broadcast by member 
stations. The remainder of this paper evaluates empirical 
evidence of Code's effect on station profit. 
19
 
III. Single-Equation Regression Results 
The previous section demonstrates that it is 
theoretically possible for a cartel to raise joint station 
profit by restricting the number of commercials, even though 
the industry's output is commercial exposures. Joint profit 
maximization is not assured, however. Profit may be 
dissipated by competition in program quality or by weak or 
inefficient enforcement. Nevertheless, television stations 
subscribed to the code, and so the possibility that the code 
functioned as an effective supply-reducing cartel must be 
entertained. 
The analysis to follow examines two hypotheses. First, 
a station was more likely to subscribe to the code if 
subscribing enhanced the code's cartel effectiveness. 
Second, station profits were higher, ceteris paribus, if the 
station operated in a market where its major competitors 
were subscribers. This section describes the data base and 
presents the results of three single-equation models. The 
next section presents a two-equation "dummy endogenous 
variable" model. 
Data 
A successful television station cartel increases station 
profit. The measure of station profit used here is station 
20
 
sale price,20 Station sale price has two key advantages 
over its alternative and several disadvantages. An 
important advantage of sale price is that it directly 
measures the desired information: present value of current 
and anticipated net revenue. The usual alternative measure 
of profit, based on accounting data,21 only shows present 
performance and may not meaningfully measure economic profit 
and expected risk. 22 Station sale price data are also 
readily available and in the public domain. 
Station sales price is not without fault. Sale price 
misstates station profit if markets for capital assets are 
imperfect, although this is a statistical problem only if 
the errors are systematic in one direction. Another 
disadvantage is the relatively small sample of stations 
sold. We modify our conclusions accordingly. 
The sample points consist of eighty-nine u.s. commercial 
television stations sold between January, 1976 and the NAB's 
suspension of the Code's advertising provisions in March, 
1982. Cases are excluded if the station had no commercial 
2°Levin (1964, 1975) uses station sale price in studying 
the television industry. Levin does not examine NAB or code 
effects, however. 
21A number of authors use accounting data. Again, none 
of these authors examine the potential effects of the NAB or 
its code. See Fournier and Martin (1983), Boyer and Wirth 
(1981), and Park, Johnson, and Fishman (1976). FCC Network 
Inquiry Special Staff (1980) uses both accounting data and 
station sales price. The same source (Appendix A, pp. 39­
64) has an excellent summary of television market 
~tatistical research. 




television competitors in its market or if the sale involved 
satellite or cable assets which could not be separated when 
determining sale price or audience size. 
The relevant local market is taken to be the "designated 
market area" (DMA) defined by A. C. Nielsen Company. For 
each station or DMA, fourteen variables were recorded. They 
are summarized in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSIONS 
Name Source Definition 
Praw 1 Station sale price (Smillions). 
HH 3 Number of television households 
in November 1979 (1000 homes). 
in the DMA 
Ca 3 Percent of DMA households wired for cable. 
Sp 3 Station market share. 
Sd 3 Percent of station viewers 
in the DMA. 
residing 
SSt 3 Sum of shares of commercial stations in DMA. 
SSoc 3 Sum of shares of commercial stations 
subscribing to the code in the DMA, excluding 
the sample station. 
Nc 3 The number of large commercial stations 
viewable in the DMA. Includes some powerful 
stations in adjacent DMAs and excludes 
satellite stations and stations so small that 
Nielsen records no market share. 
y 5 Per capita income in the DMA in 1979. 
T 1 . Number of months between sale date and 3/82. 
c 4 One if station was code subscriber 
22
 
at or immediately following date of sale, zero 
otherwise. 













1. Broadcasting-Cablecasting Yearbook, various years. 
2. Code News, various issues. 
3. A. C. Nielsen, and Co., Market Daypart Summaries. 
4. spot Television Rates and Data, various issues. 
5. County and City Data Book, 1983. 
Unless otherwise stated, data are recorded at time of 
sale. 
The analysis also uses several transformed variables. 
The, variable A is station audience size, defined as (Sp/ 
Sd)HH. CP is an index of potential cartel effectiveness, 
defined as 100[Sp(C)+SSoc]/SSt. CPo is a second index of 
potential cartel effectiveness which excludes the given 
station and	 is defined as 100(SSoc/SSt). Pi is station sale 
price adjusted for differences in year of sale and is 
defined as praw.e r (T-28). T=28 for November 1979 and r = 
1 
.00844 = G/12. G is the geometric mean annual Moody Aaa 
corporate bond yield for 1976-81. 23 %~CP is the percentage 
point change in code penetration when the sample station 
subscribes to the code. 
23This measure ignores depreciation but yields better 
statistical fits that our alternative which adjusted Praw by 
a price index. 
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Analysis of Subscriber Motivation 
Television stations obviously subscribed to the code 
(and paid a discriminatory fee to do so). The question of 
interest here is whether one of the motives for such 
behavior was to benefit from and to enhance the code's 
cartel effects. 
We model the sale price of station i at time 0 as 
follows: 
(Sa) 
R.	 is the component of net revenue which would obtain in 
1 
the absence of any code output restrictions and R~ is the 
component attributable to the workings of the code as a 
cartel. For the latter term, the upper limit of integration 
(r)	 will be finite if stations accurately foresaw the demise 
of	 the code's advertising provisions. 
Furthermore, we assume the following: 
R. ( t)
1 




Y. (t), MS. (t) ]
1 1 
(Sb) 
= Rc [C. (t), CP. (t), MS. (t) ]
111 
Station audience size (A.) may itself depend on some of the 
1 
other variables in equations (Sb). MS represents one or 
more aspects of local market structure and influences both 
components of net revenue; Nc and Ca are used as the market 
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structure measures. The variables CP and CPo measure "code 
penetration" or "potential cartel effectiveness" with and 
without participation by the sample station, respectively. 
Probit analysis is one approach to determine whether 
membership in the code was influenced by the code's ability 
* to influence market	 behavior. Let C. be the unobserved 
1 
index of incentive for station i to subscribe to the code. 
C* is assumed to be function of a number of station and 
market characteristics which mayor may not be related to 
the code. C* can then be modeled as follows (omitting 1 
subscripts): 
( 6 ) 
C = 1 if c* > 0; C = 0 otherwise 
If cartel effects are important, we expect > 0, as > 0,a7 
and a ~ O.9 
A complete probit regression yielded the following 
results: 
J' 
C*= -3.2S1 + 0.015A	 + O.OOSCa - 0.113Nc + 0.3S0Y - 0.551V 
(1.22) (3.02) (0.55) (1.29) (1.90) (1.42) 
+ 1.081N - 0.002CPo + 0.0003%~CP + 0.004T (7) 
(2.12)	 (0.11) (0.02) (0.42) 
2 -2[It-ratiosl in parentheses; R =.26; R =.37; pc= 76%]p p
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For this and other probit regressions, summary 
statistics are defined as follows [see Maddala (1983), 
sec. 2.11]: 
R~ = pseudo-R2 = 1	 - (L /L )2/nw n 
pc = percent of cases correctly predicted. 
where: = maximized likelihood, 
restricted likelihood (slope parameters 
a., j ~ 1, constrained to zero,
J 
n = sample size. 
The coefficients on CPo, %~CP, and T are statistically 
insignificant in equation (7). Because of collinearity, we 
test the null hypothesis that a = a = a = O. Imposing7 8 9 
this restriction, we obtain the likelihood-ratio test 
statistic x~ = 0.266 and cannot reject the null hypothesis 
at the 10% level. 
If all insignificant variables are dropped from equation 
(7), we obtain the following probit results: 
& = -3.45 + O.013A + O.347Y + O.982N 
( 8 ) (2.45)	 (2.93) (1.92) (2.57)
 
R2 -2
[ It-ratiosl in parentheses, = .23 ; R = .33 ; pc = 74%]p p 
rhe coefficients of A, Y, and N do not change 




Analvsis of Sale Price and Market Share 
In equations (Sa) and (5b), we hypothesize that sale 
price depends on audience size, market and station 
characteristics, and possibly also on cartel effects of the 
code. In the probit analysis above, code membership 
incentive is addressed directly and seems unaffected by its 
potential cartel advantages. Another approach is to use 
linear regression analysis to see if the cartel potential of 
the code affects station sales price (as a measure of 
station profit). 
For reasons explained below, a log-linear regression 
specification is used (i subscripts omitted): 
LnP = ~O + ~lLnA + ~2Lnca + ~LnNc + ~4LnY 
+	 ~SV + ~6N + ~7C + ~8LnCP + uP (9) 
Estimation by OLS yields the following: 
LnP= -3.052 + 1.029LnA + 0.OS7LnCa + 0.23SLnNc + 0.402LnY 
(2.32) (8.99) (0.66) (0.88) (0.67) 
+	 O.205V - 0.S94N + 0.331C - O.OSOLnCP (10) 
(l.OS) (2.34) (1.47) (0.38) 
[It-ratiosl in parentheses; R2 = .59; R2 = .55] 
Only the audience size and network affiliation 
elasticities are significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level, and the latter is unexpectedly negative. Testing the 
null hypothesis that ~7 = ~8 = 0, we obtain a test statistic 




The unexpected signs and low t-ratios in equation (10) 
are due in part to strong collinear relationships among the 
exogenous variables. In particular, LnA is an approximately 
linear combination of several of the others and A was a 
significant explanatory variable in equation (8). We must 
therefore determine if cartel effects of the code were 
influential after all, but were felt indirectly as 
determinants of audience size. 
The log-linear specification of equation (9) splits A = 
(Sp/Sd)HH into the sum of two logarithmic terms. Define S = 
100(Sp/Sd) as the "share factor". Since the code could 
hardly influence the number of households in a market, we 
examine the determinants of LnS. Estimation by OLS yields 
the following results: 
LnS = 1.526 + 0.008LnCa - 0.488LnNc + 0.409LnY 
(1.64) (0.13) (2.46) (0.91) 
+ 0.669V + 1.542N + 0.162C - O.lllLnCP (11) 
(4.76)	 (8.22) 1.03) (1.12) 
R2 2[It-ratiosl in	 parentheses: = .71; R = .68] 
Income appears to have no effect on market share, as 
expected, and cable penetration is also insignificant. Code 
and code penetration have individually insignificant 
coefficients. A test of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of C and LnCP are jointly zero yields F2 ,81 = 




For completeness, we also report the "best" (in terms of 
R2 ) market share and sale price regressions: 
LnS = 1.964 - 0.511LnNc + 0.642V + 1.626N	 (12) 
(6.11)	 (2.77) (4.47) (9.67) 
R2 -2[It-ratios I in parentheses; = .70; R = .69] 
LnP = -7.388 + 0.906LnS + 1.156LnHH + 0.225C (13 ) 
(8.04) (8.88) (8.86) (1.20) 
[It-ratiosl in parentheses; R2 = .58; R2 = .56] 
In equation (12), the principal determinants of station 
market share appear to be the number of large competing 
stations, possession of a VHF channel, and network 
affiliation. This is plausible. The negative effect of 
LnNc needs no explanation. VHF signals carry farther and 
with greater clarity than UHF, so a larger share of any 
market tends to watch a VHF channel. Network affiliation 
may capture the effects of program quality and type which 
appeal to the majority of viewers and which we cannot 
measure separately. 
Equation (13) tells us that the major predictor of sale 
price is audience size and that the two components of 
audience size are individually significant. Code membership 
has a positive coefficient, but is insignificant at the 10% 
level. Equations (12) and (13) together suggest that the 
reason why N has a negative sign and LnNc and V are 
insignificant in equation (10) is due to the strong side 
relation between these three variables and the share 
29
 
component of audience size. By this line of reasoning, we 
would also conclude that per capita income and cable 
penetration are merely unimportant factors in determining 
sale price in our sample. 
Thus far it seems that code membership and code 
penetration have no statistically significant effect, singly 
or jointly, on sale price, audience size, or motivation to 
join the code. One more issue needs examination, however. 
The decision to subscribe to the code is not exogenous in 
the sale price equation. We see in equation (8), for 
example, that audience size has a positive effect on the 
probability that a station subscribes to the code. But 
audience size and price are highly correlated, as equations 
(10) and (13) confirm. 24 If P is substituted for A in 
equation (8), the results are largely unchanged. If C 
affects P, but P affects C, then our single-equation 
regressions suffer from simultaneous equations bias. 25 A 
two-equation specification is called for, and to this we now 
turn. 
24The sample correlations are r(A,P) = .79 and 
r(LnA,LnP) = .74. 
25If each has a direct (positive) effect on the other, 
then the OLS estimates of the coefficient of C in the price 
equations will be biased upward. 
30
 
IV. Simultaneous-Equation Regression Results 
For simultaneous-equation analysis, we employ a slightly 
expanded version of the dummy endogenous variable (DEV) 
model developed by Heckman (1978) and subsequently modified 
in Maddala (1983, sec. 5.8). 
*Define E. as an unobserved index of the "cartel 
1 
potentla. 1" 0 f t he cod'e ln telh .th statlon., s mar ket. As 
before, let C~ represent the unobserved incentive for the 
1 
.th. b 'b h d d ' h 11 statlon to su scrl e to t e co e. A optlng t e og­
linear specification of the previous section and omitting i 
subscripts and constant terms, write: 
(14a) 
LnP = b1C + b2E
* + b3LnS + b4LnHH + bSLnCa 
+ b LnNc + b LnY + b V + b N + uP (14b)6 7 8 9
CC* = E + C Lnp(O) + c T + C B + u (14c)
1 2 3

C = 1 if c* > 0; C = 0 otherwise. (14d)
 
Equation (14a) hypothesizes that cartel effectiveness of 
the code depends upon market structure, code penetration 
without participation of the sample station, and whether or 
not the sample station is a code subscriber. Equation (14b) 
can best be understood by referring to equations (Sa) and 




in (Sa). Market structure variables appear twice on the 
right hand side as in (Sb). Equation (14c) models the 
station's incentive to subscribe to the code as a function 
of cartel effectiveness, on the sale price of the station if 
it does not subscribe [Lnp(O) = LnP with b = 0 in (14b)],l 
and on other factors. 
Some parameters in equations (14) must be restricted to 
ensure logical consistency. Substitution of (14a) and (14b) 
into (14c) yields C* = a l (1+b2c l )C + [other terms]. 
However, the probability of the event "station subscribes" 
(a function of C*) cannot depend on whether the event has 
already occurred (C = 1 or 0). Hence, a l (1+b2c l ) must be 
zero. Since the possibility that b 2 = 0 is of interest in 
this analysis, the chosen restriction is = O. C isa l 
* *(0)dropped from equation (14a) and E becomes E .26 
This logical consistency parameter restriction cleans up 
the DEV model. With ~(O) on the right hand side of (14b), 
the effect of subscribing to the code is confined to the blC 
term. In equation (14c), Lnp(O) now accurately reflects the 
sale price of a station when it does not subscribe, since it 
now equals LnP when both a l and b l = O. Subscription by the 
sample station does not affect LnCPo. 
Substituting (14a) into (14b) and (14c) yielcs the 
following regression model in observable variables or 
events: 
26Logical consistency conditions are derived rigorously 
in Maddala (1983). 
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* c = ~o + 1lLnCPo + ~2LnS + ~3LnHH + ~4LnCa + ~SLnNc 
c
+~6LnY + ~7V + ~8N + 19T + ~lOB + w (lSa) 
C = 1 if C* > O~ C = 0 otherwise. (lSc) 
Equations (IS) constitute a partially reduced form of 
the structural model in equations (14), and several 
structural parameters are overidentified, as can be seen 
from the parameter and error term correspondence list in 
Table 2. 
Since E* measures an index of positive cartel 
effectiveness in equations (14a) and (14c), we anticipate a l 
> 0 and a 2 > O. Competition from cable systems might reduce 
this index, suggesting ~ O. In view of Stigler's (1964)a 3 
observations on oligopoly and collusion, we expect cartel 
restrictions to be harder to establish and enforce when the 
number of sizeable competitors is large, implying < o.a 4 
If the code had a positive effect on station profits and 
asset values, then bl and/or b2 > 0 is expected. Parameters 
b3 , b4 , b7 , bS' and b9 are expected to be positive and bS 
and b6 negative. 
The parameters in (14c) bear explanation. Equation 
(14c) corresponds to equation (5.70) in Maddala's revision 
of the Heckman model (Maddala, 1983, p. 132). The time­
until-code-suspension (T) and NAB membership dummy (B) 
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TABLE 
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND 
Profit Equation 
~l	 = b l 11 
=~2 a 2b2 12 
=~3	 b3 13 
=~4	 b4 14 
a 3b2 + bS~S	 = 15 
= a 4b 2 + b6~6 16 
~7 = b7 17 
= b~a	 1aa 
~9 = b9 19 
110 
e	 CwP = b2u +u
P w
variables have been included to 




= a 2 (l+c l b2 ) 
=	 b3c I 
=	 b4c l 
= a 3 + c l (a 3b2 + bS) 
= a4 + c l (a4b2 + b 6 ) 
= b7c l 
= bacl 
= b 9c l 
= c 2 
= c 3 
c =	 (l+b2c )u
e +cluP + U1 
aid in model identification: 
Recall that a station may 
be a code subscriber, an NAB member, both, or neither. The 
activities of the NAB are primarily of a technical or 
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national nature. NAB influence in local television markets, 
if any, would be felt through the Television Code and the 
NAB's Code Authority subsidiary. Yet the major networks and 
most of their affiliated stations are both NAB members and 
Code subscribers. Hence, we take B (the result of a 
station's NAB membership decision) to be exogenous to this 
model. However, we expect that B will be a good predictor 
of, even if not causally related to, the code subscription 
decision. 
We expect c > 0 in (14c). The fact that C appears on
I 
the right hand side of (14b) and Lnp(O) on the right hand 
side of (14c) is the source of possible simultaneity in the 
DEV model. A positive sign for need not be indicative ofc1 
cartel effectiveness, however, since stations may subscribe 
to the code for other reasons, such as reduced risk of 
problems with FCC license renewal. Higher-value stations 
presumably have more to protect in these circumstances, 27 
and are therefore more apt to become code subscribers. 
Combining these sign expectations with the parameter 
correspondences, we expect ~5' ~6' 14' and 15 to be negative 
in equations (15). The remaining parameters should be ~ O. 
From the single-equation results of the previous section, we 
know there will be data matrix conditioning problems. An 
additional complication is that the probit technique to be 
applied to (15a) estimates the 1 coefficients only up to a 
27This thesis is central to Galbraith's New Industrial 
State (1967), for example.' 
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scale factor. We will find it helpful to estimate both the 
full DEV model and a limited version with some variables 
omitted or relocated. 
Full DEV Model 
The identification and estimation of equations (15) are 
discussed in Maddala and Lee (1976) and extended in Maddala 
(1983). Two-stage nonlinear least squares (2NLS), an 
asymptotically efficient estimation technique, is employed. 
Equation l5a is estimated by probit maximum likelihood 
. A .
methods. After fltted values C* are substltuted for C, 
equation (15b) is estimated by OLS. 
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients and summary 
statistics for two versions of the DEV model. The 
asymptotic standard errors, obtained from the variant of the 
Nelson-Olsen method demonstrated in Maddala (1983, pp. 244­
45), are in parentheses. Column (la) lists the probit 
estimates of the reduced form incentive-to-subscribe 
equation (15a). B is the only individually significant 
predictor. Eighty-three percent of stations were correctly 
assigned to the C = 0 or C = 1 category. 28 The second-stage 
estimates of sale price equation (15b) are in column (lb). 
About fifty-five perceDt of the variation in LnP is 
explained. LnS and LnHH have positive coefficients which 
are significantly different from zero at the one percent 
281f B is omitted, the prediction level falls to 75% and 
the co~fficients of LnS and LnHH are jointly significant. 
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level. The coefficients of LnNc, LnY, V, and N have the 
expected sign, but are not significant at the ten percent 
level. The coefficient of LnCa is insignificantly positive, 
as before. 
With regard to the effect of the code on sale price, we 
observe that the estimate of the elasticity with respect to 
code penetration is negative, but not significantly 
different from zero at ten percent. The anomaly is that ~l' 
the coefficient of C is signif.icantly negative. Since ~l = 
bl , we conclude that the mere act of subscribing to the code 
did not increase a station's sale price or asset value. We 
return to this matter below. 
Finally, from the list of parameter correspondences in 
Table 2, we see that the direct estimates of b3 , b4 , b7 , ba' 
and b9 are positive, while the estimates of ~2' ~3' ~6' and 
1a are positive, as anticipated. Thus, the bulk of the 
evidence suggests that ~ O. Overidentification preventsc l 
a more precise test. 
Short DEV Model 
Inasmuch as collinearity within equations may have 
reduced the efficiency of the above parameter estimators, a 
smaller DEV model is also estimated. Several variables are 
omitted altogether: LnCa and T because they are 
insignificant in all previous regressions~ V and LnNc 
because their influence seems wholly captured by the market 



















































MODEL ESTIMATES ( 1) 
LnP C 
( Ib) (2a) 
-9.750 -5.701 
(2.422) (3.272) 















































(l)Sarnple size = 89; asymptotic standard errors 
-2 d' d 2 -2 d . . din parentheses; R = a ]uste R; R = a ]ustep 
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pseudo-R2 ; pc = percent of cases correctly 
predicted. 
figured positively in the incentive-to-subscribe equation 
(8), but not in the second-stage estimates of column (lb) in 
Table 3. Hence, a reformulation of equations (14) is 
entertained. Parameters a 3 , a4 , and bS to bg are set at 
zero, eliminating LnCa, LnNc, LnY, V, and N from equations 
(14a) and (14b). We set c 2 = 0 and add terms C4LnY and CSN 
to equation (14c), expecting c4 > 0 and c > O.s 
Substitution and simplification yields a regression model 
similar to equations (lS). 
The probit reduced-form results for this shorter DEV 
model are listed in column (2a) of Table 3, and the second-
stage estimates in column (2b). Looking at the former, 
observe that c4 and C appear to be positive, but only B iss 
a significant predictor (as before). Omission of 
insignificant variables improves the fit (R2 ) for the sale 
price equation, and the audience size variables (LnS and 
LnHH) are significantly positive. As with the complete DEV 
model, the coefficient of LnCPo is negative and 
insignificant, while that of C is significantly negative at 
the 1% level. 
In summary, sale price seems to depend primarily on 
audience size, which itself is determined in part by the 
station's equipment, network affiliation, and number of 
competitors. Neither code penetration nor code 
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subscribership raises profits or asset values. Penetration 
is wholly irrelevant, based on the results above, but 
subscribership seems to have a negative effect, and this is 
the anomaly that we cannot adequately account for. We offer 
some thoughts on this before the final summary in Part Five. 
If the code did not serve as a successful output-
restricting institution, then stations may have subscribed 
merely for the "insurance and reputation" motives discussed 
earlier. This would make subscription a cost, which should 
show up negatively in a profit or revenue function. But 
this would be a small cost, and, given the voluntary nature 
of the code, completely avoidable. It is extremely 
surprising, therefore, that the coefficient of C should be 
so significantly negative as it is in Table 3. 
An alternative explanation which is more probable is 
that stations subscribed to the code when profits (asset 
values) were low, in hopes of raising them. A pooled cross-
section time-series data base might be necessary to explore 
this possibility. But this explanation is contradicted by 
two sets of findings in this paper. First, the incentive to 
subscribe seems positively related to audience size in Part 
Three, and audience size is virtually a proxy for sale 
price. Second, the indirect evidence from the DEV model 
suggests that c l ~ 0 in equation (14c), meaning that the 
more valuable a station was without subscribing, the more 
likely it was to subscribe--it was at least not less likely 
to subscribe. 
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A final possibility is that the code did in fact 
restrict the supply of commercial exposures, so stations 
frittered away their profits in the uncontrolled program 
quality dimension. Individual (not joint) profit 
maximization subject to the output constraint would result 
in lower profits than would otherwise obtain. If this were 
the case, however, the effect would almost certainly show up 
in association with the code penetration, not the code 
subscribership, variable. The coefficient of LnCPo is 
negative in the DEV models, but it is never remotely 
significant in any of the regressions. Since none of these 
explanations are satisfactory, the significantly negative 
coefficient of C is a "disturbing artifact" which we can 
report but not explain. 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
The theory developed in part one demonstrates the 
ability of a television trade association to raise industry 
profit by reducing the number of commercials, even though 
the actual product is commercial exposures. It is 'not clear 
to what extent this extra profit might be eroded by 
increased competition along the dimensions of program 
quality, type, and scheduling. It is clear, however, that 
the Justice Department brought an antitrust suit against the 
NAB for restricting the number of commercials. If the suit 
had economic justification, then the prosecution must have 
believed that the commercial restrictions either could have 
or actually did raise station profits above the competitive 
level. 
Under a per se rule, the government's case is 
substantiated if the television code could have raised 
profits through cartel operations. But under a rule of 
reason, normally applied in trade association cases, the 
successful prosecution of the suit requires evidence that 
the code actually did raise station profits. 
The empirical results in this paper are based on such 
indirect evidence as is available. They show that code 
penetration or code membership in the local market area had 
no discernible direct effect on profits. 
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In interpreting these results, it must be kept in mind 
that code membership may have been chosen for reasons 
unrelated to cartel output restrictions. The code provided 
monitoring and other services to members for a nominal (if 
discriminatory) fee. These services reduce station risk at 
license renewal time. Membership may also be valuable in 
signalling the station's reputability to potential 
advertisers and interested community groups. 
Thus, a finding of anticompetitive or cartel effect of 
the code depends heavily on the code penetration variable. 
Surely a cartel is more effective in any given market area 
the higher the proportion of members it has. Yet the 
various measures of penetration are not positively related 
to station profitability even in the "best" simultaneous 
equation regressions (i.e., those in Table 3). 
Given these results, our findings are that: (1) the 
television code did not successfully increase member station 
profits through restrictions on the output of commercial 
exposures, (2) since stations chose to become members, code 
membership appears to have been determined by factors which 
were unrelated to the antitrust suit, and therefore (3) the 
government's antitrust suit was economically ill-advised, 
especially if a "rule of reason" was to be applied to 
evaluating industry conduct and performance. 
These findings are deliberately cautious for both legal 
and statistical reasons. Had the antitrust case been 
decided in court under a rule of reason, the NAB would have 
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to be acquitted unless found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 
The evidence in this paper favors the NAB but is based on 
indirect estimates obtained with asymptotically efficient 
methods applied to a relatively small sample of observations 
on station sale prices. A cross-sectional census of actual 
station profits and audience size for, say, 1978 (before the 
code was challenged) could undoubtedly deliver more 
definitive results, although we have no reason to believe 
the conclusions of such a study would differ from those 
presented here. 
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